Control: A Treatise on Mousa Dembele

The Belgian midfielder has gone from peripheral figure to centrepiece in Mauricio Pochettino’s Tottenham team. Here I look at the key areas in which he contributes to Spurs’ game.

To begin, some statistics to whet the appetite from the 2015-16 season: when Dembele featured, Harry Kane scored 24 goals in 27 appearances; in Dembele’s absence, Kane managed 1 goal in 11. And this naturally impacted results: Spurs lost 7% of games in which Dembele featured, compared to 44% without him.

What does he do to give him this influence? He controls midfield, and levers Spurs into positions from which to attack.

***

The attribute from which everything else stems is Dembele’s strength. This helps him to win and retain the ball.  He has made 2.8 successful tackles per game this season with a 92% pass success rate, the highest in the league.

His strength, and his dribbling ability (examined below in greater depth), make him press-resistant and thus capable of leading Spurs up the pitch, from defence into advanced midfield, often beating 2 or 3 players to do so. These pictures from West Brom (H) last season showcase this:

Dembele receives the ball with his back to goal and two opposition attackers closing in…

Blink and he’s away.

Thus Dembele manoeuvres Spurs time and time again towards their preferred attacking shape:

And eventually into:

Setting up camp in the opposition half with Dembele as far forward as possible.

It is all about the battle for this platform from which to attack; for Spurs, it is about getting creator-in-chief Christian Eriksen on the ball. When Dembele controls midfield, Eriksen sees plenty of the ball. These pass maps (with thanks to @11tegen11 on Twitter) from recent dominant home wins are notable for Eriksen’s great number of touches and average position high up the pitch:

Dembele and Eriksen are the key prongs for Spurs to control midfield and create chances. A look at @11tegen11’s Twitter account reveals that, across the season, the more prevalent Dembele’s role in any game, then the more prevalent Eriksen’s role, and the more likely is victory. They are essential to Mauricio Pochettino’s style of football.

The main criticism I see of Dembele is that he slows games down (compared to, say, the ‘adventurous’ Harry Winks) but I believe that this is exactly how Pochettino wants Spurs to play. Their best performances are when matches are closed, not open – when they are in control. You rarely see an end-to-end Spurs match.

Spurs attack by dominating possession, probing forward, recycling possession again and again around the edge of the final third, and then winning the ball back as quickly as possible when they lose it. Dembele’s ability at winning, retaining and shifting the ball contributes to this a lot. Whilst it may seem like Dembele is an unnecessary cog in games in which Spurs control, I would argue that he is most significant in creating and maintaining that control.

Spurs can still attack with speed – when they lose the ball, they counter-press and counter-attack at pace. However, this is situational, rather than being the main style of play.

When the attacking players are on form, this structure combines with Eriksen’s creativity and Dele Alli and Harry Kane’s movement to fashion plenty of opportunities. The 3-4-2-1 (or subtle variants) has seen 25 Spurs goals in 9 matches this season.

 

Starting Attacks

Dembele’s ball-carrying deserves greater attention. It both allows him to move Spurs up the pitch (as described above) and to generate attacks. He commits opposition players and thus creates space. An obvious example of this came away at Stoke last season. He beat a couple of players, attracted the attention of a couple more and thus found half a yard for Kane to strike into the bottom corner:

Dembele holding the ball 40 yards out with limited options…

He beats two defenders and attracts two more, and Kane only needed a yard of space.

Recently, Spurs v Gent was a clear example of this. Spurs lost a lot of midfield control after Dembele’s substitution, as the opposition struggled to stop him manoeuvring attacks into dangerous areas of the pitch.

His dribbling statistics, for a central midfielder, are excellent. He has completed 3.1 dribbles per game – fifth in the league, behind four wingers (Adama Traore, Wilfried Zaha, Eden Hazard, and Sofiane Boufal). He has 84% take-on success rate, completing 54 of 64 attempted. This is 3.64 per game, 0.89 more than the next best midfielder (Jack Wilshere), and 1.4 more than the obvious comparison point of Paul Pogba. Every completed take-on moves Spurs closer to their desired attacking formation without ceding possession.

Occasionally this dribbling will result very directly in a goal or a chance. Arsenal away this season is the clearest example:

He is about to receive the ball from Eric Dier, near the halfway line and facing his own goal…

Five seconds later he has eased through Arsenal’s midfield and won a penalty.

I would really like to see him be more ambitious – using his dribbling prowess more in the final third, rather than just using it to move his side into the final third. If Dembele scythed open the last lines of defence himself, it would add yet another dimension to Spurs’ attack. This would elevate Dembele into the very top table of central midfielders in Europe.

Fitness

Fitness is the biggest question mark hanging over Mousa Dembele. He has only completed the full 90 minutes five times in all competitions this season; he has been substituted between minutes 60 and 85 fourteen times. He normally makes way for Harry Winks.

This is frustrating. Winks is a rapidly developing footballer who is showing regular flashes of impacting the midfield battle (most commendably away at Manchester City in the last twenty minutes). He does not however yet possess the kind of brute strength and press-resistance of Dembele, so Tottenham do lose control in midfield when the Belgian departs.

Winks is more ambitious than Dembele in possession. This can be ideal when Spurs need a goal, as Winks’ range and pace of passing helps to shift the play quickly. It opens up games. This also has drawbacks.

Sometimes – as when 2-1 up at home to Gent, and dominating, but requiring another goal – Spurs want the game to remain more closed. They can continue to probe slowly but purposefully, and be confident of finding another goal. When Dembele went off, the game opened up and Gent were able to catch Spurs on the break.

And naturally, when leading games, Spurs want to shut the game down. Players with Dembele’s physique and skillset are ideal here; it is easiest to shut games down when in ‘quiet’ possession.

This is why Dembele’s fitness issues are frustrating: he epitomises Pochettino’s vision of controlled possession and attack-building. There is not much more to say beyond this. Pochettino just needs to get as many minutes as possible out of him across the season.

***

That broadly sets out what I see Mousa Dembele as contributing to his Tottenham team. I would be interested to hear responses to this.

I also feel that a follow-up article on Christian Eriksen is essential. He is the other crucial component in making this Spurs side tick.

Thank you for reading!

Check out the following sites which have proved very helpful in the writing of this piece:

@TTTactics with a slightly different take on Dembele, arguing that the move to a back three has reduced his workload – https://talkingtottenhamtactics.wordpress.com/2017/01/15/back-three-part-one/

@11tegen11 on Twitter – some very interesting analytics

WhoScored and Squawka – the source of all my statistics

ShareMyTactics.Com – for the formation graphics I have used.

Wimmer or Davies? The nature of Vertonghen’s role, and who can do it better

7 consecutive victories have created a pretty picture at Spurs. The 3-4-2-1 (ish) formation has met with considerable success, bringing the best out of every individual. It is the ultimate depiction of ‘more-than-the-sum-of-its-parts’. It enables Pochettino to pick his best eleven players, in their best eleven roles. The parts function perfectly. Each part is where it wants to be, and where every other part wants it to be. But now one of those parts is injured. It looks bad. The system is perfect but a part is broken.

Being the left-sided centre-back of three is absolutely perfect for Jan Vertonghen. We can virtually take the defensive side of his game for granted – he has had an excellent season. He averages 8.9 clearances a game, which is genuinely ridiculous, and is testament to his positioning. Barring a suspension, he was an everpresent until sustaining the injury on Saturday.

But 3-4-2-1 lets the wide centre-backs venture forward, and Jan loves it. He can carry the ball into midfield at will, knowing that he will be covered by his fellow centre-backs. In recent weeks he has displayed the kind of ambition and adventure that we would associate with his first season at the Lane. In terms of the system, it is just another way to stretch the play and build attacks. Spurs are bordering on total football at the moment. They are so multi-dimensional, battering teams from every angle. Just look at the average position map for the first half on Saturday. It wasn’t football. It was an onslaught.

Look at the front five. Look at Vertonghen.

Spurs do not want to lose a dimension from their game. They essentially want Kevin Wimmer or Ben Davies to step in, in the very model of Jan Vertonghen, and become him, for as many weeks as is necessary. All ten outfield positions defend aggressively and attack aggressively and this is essential. Spurs are an oppressive, high-functioning unit and they cannot put up with a bit-part.

Can either of them do this?

I’d love to do a neat statistical comparison, but seeing as it is a new system, in which Wimmer has played about 200 minutes and Davies just the 30 in their Spurs careers, this is not possible. So I shall have to talk about intangibles, like attributes or characteristics (*gasps*).

Let us have a look at Wimmer. He filled in for nine matches towards the back end of last season next to Alderweireld, contributing to a total personal record of seven wins, three draws and one loss at centre back. This year he appeared away at Arsenal and Watford, not conceding a goal in open play.

He is good on the ball, happy to pass short and long and with a solid success rate. His vertical pass into Dele Alli, leading to Harry Kane’s second in the 3-0 home win over Bournemouth, sticks in the memory. He does not possess the roaming supremacy of Vertonghen but he is not afraid to push forward. One would hope that he would grow into the role that the system demands.

Defensively I like him too. He is solid. He is a bit of a lump, but he is not immobile, he knows what he is doing, his concentration and positioning are good. He will never be the all-action defensive centre-back that Jan is, but I would readily describe him as reliable. There are things he needs to learn – such as, not flying into a 30-70 on the halfway line – but footballers are allowed to improve, and regular playing time gives anyone a boost in sharpness anyway.

Wimmer was not on the bench on Saturday (no room for a centre back, and especially one of Wimmer’s size), so Ben Davies stepped in for Jan for half an hour. He is not unaccustomed to the role, playing there regularly for Wales, and impressively so during Euro 2016.

I am very indifferent towards Davies. He is tidy on the ball, but unambitious, and he is a decent defender, but unspectacular. I do not think that he has the right mentality for Pochettino’s style of football. I am not suggesting that he has an attitude problem. He is a committed and determined footballer, but I don’t see that bite, that dynamism, that physicality in him. On Saturday Spurs had ten conquerors on the field, dominating the pitch and dominating the opposition. Does Davies possess those characteristics? (Does Wimmer?)

I would also point towards his height. Our favoured starting XI is ostensibly without weakness, but Davies is below six foot, and lacking presence. He has lost 12 of 26 aerial duels in the league this season. Jan has lost just 22 of 97. Wimmer has lost 3 of 9, in a tiny sample size. I fear that a centre-forward will forget about Eric Dier and Toby Alderweireld and attach himself to Davies, backing himself to win a few headers. Spurs should know all about this threat – Dele Alli drifted between Victor Moses and Cesar Azpilicueta twice, and was unchallenged for two headed goals. Flaws in the system are bad things.

***

The 3-4-2-1 simply cannot be ditched. It brings such good things out of every player. Each player is fantastic in their own right, but the whole remains greater than the parts. Resist the temptation to replace a damaged Jan Vertonghen with a shiny exciting Heung-Min Son – replace him with a slightly less brilliant Jan Vertonghen. Thus, Pochettino must select the defender that he believes to be most in the mould of the Belgian. I would say this is Wimmer. Some trust Davies more. Success or failure in this position could be the difference between success and failure in the league.

Where do Spurs go next?

It has been an indifferent start to the season for Spurs. Fifth in the league with only one defeat – fine, if a little frustrating that performances have been mixed and draws have not been turned into wins – but out of the Champions League in near-embarrassing fashion. Questions loom around the club’s short-term future – where do they go next? How does a side that finished third in 2015-16, playing some scintillating football along the way, progress?

This is going to be quite a speculative article. Previously I have liked to rely on stats to pad out my articles, but this is more off-the-cuff, addressing some key questions.

There is natural progression and there is man-made progression. Will/how can the squad develop naturally? And can it be improved through recruitment?

Let’s have a look at where Spurs are right now. The last two months have been confused. Mauricio Pochettino has attempted to adjust to the absences of Harry Kane and Toby Alderweireld by trialling various new systems – a far cry from the constant, consistent 4-2-3-1 of last year. 3-4-1-2 worked well at Arsenal – tailored to thwart a misfiring Arsenal and hide their own poor form – but the 4-1-2-1-2 diamond employed at home to West Ham was appalling. The fact that Spurs emerged victorious can only be attributed to West Ham.

But a 4-2-3-1 returned at Chelsea, and it worked – for a half – well enough to remind everyone that it is the key to Spurs’, and Pochettino’s, system. Five players joined in the summer; three or four different systems have been played this season, but last season’s system – and, very arguably, starting XI – is still Spurs’ best.

So the first way that Spurs can progress, is to find and execute the very formula that was so successful last season. Best striker, joint-best defence, arguably the strongest central midfield duo. Perhaps the latter has been most noticeably absent thus far this year. Mousa Dembele has struggled to return to his dominating ways – fitness? form? – and Eric Dier has been forced into defence. Victor Wanyama is really solid, but he cannot drop into defence in possession to truly allow the full-backs to bomb forward. Dier is also slightly better with the ball at his feet. So far this season, it has all been a bit rigid. It just doesn’t quite function.

Getting Harry Kane and Toby Alderweireld fully fit will help enormously, that goes without saying. The former leads the line and scores loads of goals; the latter is Spurs’ best defender and long-range passer.

And then there is the curiosity that is Erik Lamela. The ultimate divider of opinion. His pressing *is* important. It might seem ridiculous – praising a player for running a lot – but it is crucial. Pressing is essential to Pochettino’s system, winning the ball both high up the pitch and in the defensive third, and Lamela is very good at it. He made so many tackles last year. He breaks up opposition play, and kick-starts attacks for his team. He is creative too, and he can score goals. I wish he created and scored more, but that, combined with his defensive work, is so useful for the system.

So that is the obvious way to progress – try to return to a previous high point. 5-0 against Swansea, but doing it many, many times, and against far better teams.

But (and I am now going to cruelly, cruelly assume that Pau Lopez will play little part this season) there are four new signings for Spurs to call upon. Wanyama I have already mentioned – he has started the season very well, and may grow to find an essential place in the system as his game develops.

So that leaves three, who have quite obviously not yet demonstrated their full worth. I wrote something on Moussa Sissoko – the much, much-maligned Moussa Sissoko – just after he joined, which is here. I will be positive, and assume that Pochettino will eventually bring the best out of the Frenchman – even if it does take a full pre-season next summer. He is powerful, pacy and direct; he strikes the ball well. He is a mercurial talent, but the talent is there. I essentially refer you to the Sissoko of Euro 2016. He’s versatile too – I feel he could be employed in a 3-man central midfield, making bursting runs from deep, rather than being trapped out wide and lined up against a full-back.

Georges-Kevin Nkoudou is another midfielder who (in theory) offers something different to what Spurs already have. Signed from Marseille over the summer for something around £10m, he pledges to offer pace, trickery and goals. As yet he has only shown the slightest of glimpses but his skillset reads like a list of what Spurs lack in midfield.

So Sissoko and Nkoudou offer variety – they need to develop to the levels of the likes of Dele Alli and Christian Eriksen to make the Tottenham midfield a complete one. I would like to think that they can. They were signed with that intention.

The final signing is one who has also yet to convince. Vincent Janssen has been thrust into significantly more limelight than was perhaps expected at the start of the season, due to a 7-week lay-off for Kane between September and November. Watching him play, it is so evident that he just does not quite know what he is meant to be doing. Should he be dropping deep or staying in the box? Should he be more selfish or more creative? If he makes X run at Y time, will someone find him, or should he stay tight to his defender? He should come to learn all of this.

A point worth remembering – if Janssen had joined last season, he’d have played six out of six Europa League games – maybe even scored a few – and featured sporadically in the league. This season, he’s been thrown in to the team immediately, in both Premier League and Champions League, playing with some distinctly out-of-form midfielders.

It could have been easier for the Dutchman. With his goal record in everywhere bar England – including some excellent international goals – I am confident he will soon flourish. If Spurs can have a very viable option to rest Kane more, or challenge him if his form suffers, they will benefit enormously. Perhaps, nonetheless, a more dynamic and darty striker could be on Spurs’ wish list.

I had planned to discuss recruitment now, but as my post creeps past 1000 words, I will leave that to another post, or another blogger.

Then there’s youth, and especially Harry Winks, Josh Onomah and Cameron Carter-Vickers; as they improve, they improve the squad. I could write of their merits – especially the former’s – for pages.

The other aspect I have not yet covered is how current, high-performing players can progress to another level. Consistency is the word that springs to mind most obviously; but every player lacks certain attributes, not all of which are unattainable.

***

I am fully convinced by the Pochettino high-pressing 4-2-3-1. It worked delightfully for the majority of last year. However, we finished 3rd, and this season we lie 5th. It is time to work out how to make those small numbers even smaller.

Thank you for reading this blog. The future is clearly oh-so-bright for Spurs, but perhaps the next step is the most difficult.

 

Check out my other work here:

Moussa Sissoko: What can he offer Tottenham, and how can Tottenham use him?

Does the Eric Dier – Victor Wanyama pivot work?

Tactical Analysis: Tottenham’s 3-4-1-2 at Arsenal

Tactical Analysis: Tottenham’s 3-4-1-2 at Arsenal

Spurs’ visit to the Emirates saw Mauricio Pochettino spring a tactical surprise in a bid to break their bad run of form, as he employed a 3-4-1-2 formation. Kevin Wimmer slotted in between Jan Vertonghen and Eric Dier in a back three and Harry Kane returned to join Heung-Min Son in a front two. Christian Eriksen was afforded some much needed space in the centre of the pitch, just in front of the most solid of pairings in Mousa Dembele and Victor Wanyama; Kyle Walker and Danny Rose operated as advanced wing backs. It ultimately worked. Tottenham earned a 1-1 draw, and arguably had the better of the chances.

I shall take a look at just why it worked against Arsenal, and why it is a formation that can get the best out of certain players in Pochettino’s squad.

The three central defenders worked really well as a unit both on and off the ball. In possession, it ensured there was always a spare man to pass to. Arsenal don’t especially press – although Sanchez can be eager at times – but when they did, Spurs always had enough bodies to work around it. Hugo Lloris hardly touched the ball under pressure; compare that with the Bayer Leverkusen three days earlier, when it seemed like the ball was always being forced back to him.

Out of possession, it helped Spurs even more. As reflected in the average player positions map below, when not attempting to enforce an offside, Wimmer sat slightly deeper. This meant that when Alexis Sanchez made runs in behind Dier, Wimmer was close enough, and deep enough, to cover. This meant that Vertonghen did not need to commit to track Sanchez and be dragged across the pitch, thus maintaining the defensive structure. As a result, Arsenal never really got ‘in behind’ the defence; ‘in alongside’, sure, but Spurs were usually able to marshal their forward players well.

The wing backs probably only pushed up five yards further than usual, but the extra man at the back allowed them more freedom to influence play in every third of the pitch. Walker and Rose flanking Dembele and Wanyama built a very compact structure. This allowed Spurs to build possession easily, using the width of the pitch, and to maintain a solid defensive structure when without the ball. Dier and Vertonghen could move into the wing if either full-back was caught up field, until they recovered. Such is the beauty of their pace and stamina that Walker and Rose can get back very quickly; the centre backs are merely a contingency.

Dembele and Wanyama deserve some lip service before I move onto the attacking trio. Their solidity in midfield held the entire system together. They shared 145 touches; the former was more ambitious, completing 6 dribbles, including the remarkable run that saw him win the penalty. Both have played better; but, through their strength and intelligence, they ensured that Spurs were competitive – or even dominant, arguably – in central midfield.

Christian Eriksen has been woefully out of form in recent weeks, but the switch to 3-4-1-2 did help him. Instead of being crowded out in midfield – both by his own players and by Arsenal players – he was on his own in a little pocket, allowing him to look for either full back or either forward, releasing passes into the channels. The Son-Kane partnership worked well. Son’s running and Kane’s threat made it a potent attack, which could have linked up for a goal very early on, when Son paced past Shkodran Mustafi and crossed for Kane, only for Nacho Monreal to poke it away.

Spurs were reasonably unambitious, but did not sit back. They sought to dominate the game, whilst probably remaining slightly more wary of defence rather than attack: understandable, given the form in which each side entered the match. They were successful in this regard, creating some excellent chances for themselves, while only ceding a few clear-cut chances for Arsenal. To be fully deserving of a point at the Emirates is not to be sniffed at.

*****

I will now take a look at whether this system would be feasible if Spurs had a fully fit squad of 25 on-form players. Of course, such is the nature of football that this cannot be the case, as on Sunday, and thus different options are required. Let me have a look at the Lilywhites’ ‘ideal’ eleven when playing 3 at the back.

As opposed to 4-2-3-1 (or similar), 3-4-1-2 or 3-4-2-1 (Watford away, December 2015) sacrifices an offensive player for a defensive one, and asks the wing backs to fulfil crucial attacking functions. It is difficult to see how Alli, Son and Eriksen can all play together in this system; Georges-Kevin Nkoudou can surely not be wedged in anywhere; and Lamela and Moussa Sissoko will be so far down the pecking order with just two, or even only one, attacking midfield spot available. I don’t think this formation would work at White Hart Lane; I feel it tends towards caution, and I feel it suits large pitches. I actually think – in hindsight – that it could have worked perfectly at Wembley. It still could. Thus, it is the obvious conclusion: this is unlikely to be used on a regular basis, but is an available option if it can counteract a specific threat, or if it can allow some more in-form players to be selected.

As on Sunday, I like the look of this formation when playing against better teams. Yes, Spurs boast the best defensive record in the league with just two centre backs, but this formation really does allow a bit more time to be taken on the ball at the back; it gives a spare centre back to track runs without seeing the back line being pulled back and forth across the pitch and cut open; and it allows Tottenham’s strong, powerful central midfielders to take hold of the game and get their full backs and number 10(s) into play.

*****

Sunday’s formation arguably featured Spurs’ best 11 available players. It is very positive that Pochettino – often criticised for not having a plan B, or for taking too long to modify plan A – can analyse where Spurs went wrong in recent weeks to make a change that worked with considerable success. So far this season, he has employed 4-2-3-1, 4-4-2, 4-1-4-1 and 3-4-1-2. Spurs are countering threats, posing new threats of their own, and modifying their plans based on fitness and form of key players. I consider it very impressive to have amassed 21 points from 11 games despite having over half of last season’s best eleven (Lloris, Toby Alderweireld, Dembele, Eriksen, Dele Alli, Erik Lamela and Kane) either injured or seriously out of form for large parts of the season. This is a flexibility that was not really in evidence last year, partly due to lack of options, but surely partly due to Pochettino’s intransigence. It is a welcome change to see more imagination and proactivity from the coaching staff.

 

Thank you for reading. Please join in the discussion on Twitter @biscuitbeck, and subscribe to my blog via email if you feel so inclined.

 

(With thanks to WhoScored for statistical information)

Does the Eric Dier – Victor Wanyama pivot work?

 

The enforced absence of suspended central midfield powerhouse Mousa Dembele has resulted in Mauricio Pochettino using a double pivot (a poor phrase, as neither of them really pivot) of Eric Dier and Victor Wanyama. This combination has met with a mixed reception – it is efficient without being expansive. The fact that Tottenham have started the season brightly – eight points, seven goals for and just two against – have perhaps relieved the pair of extra scrutiny.

I am going to take a statistical/tactical look at this partnership, assessing whether it has really worked, whether it is anywhere near the Dier-Dembele dream partnership of last season, and whether it is the best central midfield duo in the Belgian’s absence. It may be harsh to compare the two with Dembele, arguably the best midfielder in the league last year, but we are a title-chasing team now, and thus should be setting high standards.

I’ll start by looking at the pair’s offensive output. Unsurprisingly, they are not such an attacking force in possession as last year’s partnership, as both are traditional defensive midfielders, happy to sit deep, make interceptions, play simple passes, and let (in theory) a more expansive partner venture forward instead. This point is proven by looking at their average positions in matches so far this season:

Dier (15) and Wanyama (12) both like to sit just in front of the defence (against Everton and Stoke away):

Whereas last season, Dier would remain deep, but Dembele (19) would operate in a slightly more advanced position (against Stoke (a) and Manchester United (h)):

This exhibits part of what makes Dembele just so intrinsic to Spurs, and demonstrates what we have lacked so far this season. He links defensive to attacking midfield. His role allows him to continue to do a similar defensive job as Dier and Wanyama, but also to join in in attack: beating opponents with his strength, slipping passes into Christian Eriksen and Dele Alli (23 and 20), whom he operates very close to, and often proving to be the ‘spare man’ on the fringe of attacks, ready to switch the play if necessary, or at least retain possession.

As seen by the average positions, Dier and Wanyama both like to sit back, and leave the attackers to attack. The effect of this could clearly be seen at the weekend, away at Stoke. Our best chances came on the counter-attack, when our attacking four – plus the full-backs – linked up together. Rarely did we see Spurs dominate possession around Stoke’s penalty area; we attacked, tried to score, and then the attack ended. That came about mostly because no-one in Dembele’s ilk was supporting the attack on the edge of the box. (The fact that Heung-Min Son, very effective on Saturday, is an ‘all-or-nothing’ attacker also contributed).

It does make perfect sense that this defensive-minded pair would struggle to support the attack quite as much, but when they are analysed defensively, they have also struggled to operate together. This is perhaps because the pair simply aren’t as good defensively as Dembele – he really did obliterate midfields last season, with an average of 3.6 tackles per game – but it may also be because they feel unsure of themselves when playing together. Who does what? Do they both defend? This perhaps explains why Pochettino has felt the need to substitute one of the pair in 2 of the 3 possible matches (against Liverpool, Dier had to move to right-back after Kyle Walker’s illness).

I’ll take a quick look at their defensive statistics. It is worth to remember at this stage that we are only four games into the season, so any numbers are based on limited playing time.

Dier and Wanyama have made a combined 4.1 tackles per game thus far; this compares to 5.7 for Dembele and Dier in 2015-16, and 5.1 for Ryan Mason and Nabil Bentaleb in 2014-15. The pair have 2.3 interceptions per game overall, comparing with 4.1 for the prolific duo of 2015-16, and 4.1 also for Pochettino’s fledgling duo of 2014-15. You would think that the pair might be extra solid – indeed, I’ve seen people say (and I had thought it too) that this partnership should be reserved for away matches at big teams – but early signs suggest that is a fallacy.

Strangely, against Liverpool, I thought the opposite of defensive solidity was true: their midfielders attacked with real pace and directness, and Wanyama and (initially) Dier kept getting caught behind the play, unable to support the defence. This is shown by the average player positions map, where Wanyama is based in contact with the attacking midfielders, but far from his centre-backs.

I have tried to point out the flaws in the partnership, thus probably coming across harsher than the pair deserve. But as I have said, it has been a solid, efficient partnership, and we’ve only conceded twice whilst netting seven – it’s just not quite the Dier-Dembele pivot. Would any other duo be better? I’ll take a quick look.

I asked my Twitter followers, and 62% of them (sample size: a majestic 47 votes) reckoned that Dele Alli should partner his best mate Eric when Dembele is unavailable. I suppose the other options, assuming Dier is a definite, are Harry Winks, Moussa Sissoko or Eriksen next to him. I’ll briefly discuss each.

Dele Alli was moved back to central midfield against Liverpool, alongside Wanyama, when Dier was forced to right-back. When he plays in this deeper role, he can burst forward and support the attack: it’s an aggressive selection, essentially adding an attacking midfielder to the team. Whether he has the discipline to carry out the necessary defensive duties – Dembele’s defensive impact is immense – is very questionable.

Eriksen can surely only be deployed in this deeper role at home against the weakest teams in the league – as he was when we hosted Swansea in February. I love this idea in an attacking sense – he can pull the strings from deeper and really, really control the game (Modric Modric Modric) – but you cannot expect him to do much defending. He is intelligent and committed in the defensive side of his game – he’ll put his foot in at the right time – but his physicality means he cannot be relied upon.

Winksy is a genuine central midfielder, tidy on the ball and eager to get stuck in – but he is completely inexperienced, perhaps slightly lightweight, and ultimately a very risky selection. I am desperate to see him get minutes – Gillingham at home should be his first start of the season – but he is surely not ready to be a first-choice option yet.

The final option is new signing Sissoko. Physically, he is most similar to Dembele – he is a monster, so powerful – but I worry that this position would be too restrictive for him, and that he may not have the necessary discipline to play there. My only other article (to date) on this site looks at his potential roles in the Spurs team, so feel free to check that out.

 

So there concludes my second piece. I hope it was insightful: feel free to join the discussion on Twitter @biscuitbeck.

Moussa Sissoko: What can he offer Tottenham, and how can Tottenham use him?

A crazy last few hours of August 31^st saw Spurs somehow gazump Everton to the signing of Newcastle’s mercurial midfield powerhouse, Moussa Sissoko, for a club-record fee of £30m. The earlier deals for Marseille’s pacy winger Georges-Kevin Nkoudou and Espanyol’s ‘keeper Pau Lopez (on loan) had seemed inevitable; the last-minute grab of Sissoko not so.

As day turned to evening and annoyance turned to meltdown, pipe dreams of signing playmakers Isco or Ante Coric had vanished. Instead, Tottenham ended up splashing out on a very different kind of midfielder.

Sissoko seemed destined for Everton. The Merseyside club had met Newcastle’s asking price of £30m and the Frenchman was set to fly north for a medical. Although events must have transpired slightly ahead of this, as of 10pm – an hour before the deadline – the Sissoko-Spurs deal simply did not exist.

The news then began to break very quickly. Daniel Levy, reportedly operating under the explicit instructions of manager Mauricio Pochettino, had matched Everton’s offer. From that point, little thought was required on the part of the player. Instantly cutting diplomatic relations with Everton, he was set for London. 58 minutes after the world had assumed him to have joined Everton, Sissoko had tweeted a picture of himself holding up the Lilywhite shirt. At 11.40pm, the club made it official.

The news – as it broke – was greeted with a mixture of excitement, hysteria and despair. Thirty million pounds. A club record fee, dragged up by Everton’s bid, and not remotely performance-incentivised. All of it will be paid. Was this sensible money for a footballer with serious ability, in the current market? Was Sissoko the versatile midfield option Spurs had been lacking? Or had Daniel Levy simply panicked and thrown money at a problem? Was Sissoko’s undoubted talent clouded by a questionable attitude to the point that this transfer represented a huge risk, both financially and to the acclaimed Spurs’ team spirit?

Throughout his time in England, the 27 year-old has been castigated for his inconsistency; accused of only showing up in big matches. He was a sure bet to overpower Chelsea at St. James’ Park or run through Germany at the Stade Velodrome when the world was watching but he could not drive his Newcastle side to, at the very least, Premier League safety. He netted just once in 39 appearances last season, a terrible return for a player of his technical ability. Yet Sissoko has constantly reiterated his belief that he is a Champions League-quality player. Surely this profile does not fit with a high-intensity, high-functioning and uber-motivated Pochettino side. It just does not seem to work; attitude and entitlement entering a setting of grit and humility.

But, as I have hinted, when his ability does shine through, Sissoko is a very talented footballer. I will first discuss his strengths generally; I shall then look at to what extent he fits the Pochettino blueprint. He is an absolute powerhouse. With a burst of acceleration he can power past opponents, creating and exploiting space and committing defenders. He is technically proficient: he can create and pass, and he should score more than he has (11 goals in 118 league matches). He has scored some crackers, but he should be notching up 10 goals a season. Perhaps that can be partly attributed to playing in a woeful Newcastle side, but he has to shoulder a lot of the blame.

The last two paragraphs detail the Sissoko paradox. He has undoubted ability, but can Pochettino bring out the best of him? Will the step up help him, as it seems to be doing Sadio Mane at Liverpool? Does he fit the blueprint? It does come down to the distinction between attitude and ability, again. He has the power, the directness, the drive on the ball. Whether he can find an entire new level of consistency to demonstrate those attributes every week is another matter. The other area of his game that I would throw a question mark over is the defensive aspect. Is he disciplined enough to track back, or can Pochettino quickly drum that into him? It is essential to hold those defensive instincts to be a midfielder under Pochettino, but I am unsure as to whether he comes ready-made with such instincts.

So now let me get specific. Where exactly could Moussa Sissoko fit into a Spurs XI? This is the section I am most looking forward to writing, for it is here where I am beginning to realise how integral a role he could play. I think that three positional/disciplinal options should be explored for him: as a disciplined central midfielder in the 4-2-3-1, as a ‘traditional’ right or left winger in the 4-2-3-1, or as an aggressive central midfielder in a 3-4-3, when in possession. This last one I particularly like the look of.

I shall start with the ‘Sissoko used as a back-up to Mousa Dembele’ theory: one of the two in the centre of midfield. This, of course, would look something like this:

Here, our new man would be expected to undertake the job that Dembele has done so successfully for the past year: controlling the midfield, and controlling the game. I am not sure whether he is up to the task. He is strong and powerful, but I am unsure if he has the discipline and determination to retain or win possession as doggedly as the Belgian does. His passing is definitely adequate, however, and depending on the situation he can burst forward and threaten the goal; he would arguably be more expansive and ambitious than Dembele would. But I am struggling to convince myself that I trust him enough to play such an important role in the team – at least, not immediately. That may just be because Dembele is so good at this role, though.

If I were Pochettino, therefore, I would be looking to ease him in in a position that holds slightly less responsibility, in a freer role further up the pitch. Perhaps as a right-winger, the position in which he flourished so dramatically for France this summer:

I like this because, as Pochettino has alluded to throughout the summer, it would give us a much-needed direct, aggressive option in attacking midfield. Sissoko can beat a man through pace and power, whereas Christian Eriksen and Erik Lamela – and to some extent Dele Alli – prefer to use guile or skill. This option could be crucial when weaker teams shut up shop at White Hart Lane, even if only utilised from the bench. I am convinced that he can and will add more goals to his game when surrounded by better players. Again, the defensive aspect of his game will need to be fine-tuned. He has to track back, and he has to press aggressively; there are no truly ‘free’ roles in Pochettino football. This can be coached into him.

The two formations above have looked at how Sissoko could fit into our current system. Now, I will look at how Spurs could alter their system to pander to his greatest attributes. I am really excited by the prospect of, when in possession, Pochettino using a 3-4-3:

We saw this at Watford away last year, both in and out of possession. It can of course be an adaptation of a 4-2-3-1 too, if Eriksen or Alli drop in; but I like the look of it when Sissoko, Eric Dier and Dembele are all selected. The full-backs can bomb on while there are two-to-three central defenders and three-to-two central midfielders to cover counter-attacks. Dembele can continue to run the game, and the two selected attacking midfielders can exploit the space in the middle of the pitch to link up with Harry Kane. This leaves the new man.

This role could be perfect for his skillset. Sissoko can make bursting runs from deep – either with or without the ball – and supplement the attack from central midfield in a way that I cannot remember Spurs doing in the recent future. He’ll be supported by Dembele and the three centre-backs behind him, and will have two attacking midfielders and Kane to play off, as well as constant options on the flanks. He could be the overloading option necessary to scythe open defences and create scoring opportunities for the extra man. Having a structured XI for the pressing game when out of possession seems to be vital for Spurs; but I would love if we could explore some variety in attack. At the very least, it can be used as a plan B.

 

That is my brief exploration of what Moussa Sissoko could bring to Tottenham Hotspur. A lot of it is conjecture; a lot of it is based on the hope/expectation that Pochettino will be able to create a consistently motivated and driven footballer. I fully hope he can, because the Frenchman has all the attributes to be a Champions League-standard midfielder; once he has found a place in a system, he needs to prove that he is one.